Disruptions to Dollar Funding Markets
The market for interbank funding in U.S. dollars is global. Many banks in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere have some dollar-denominated assets and liabilities, and thus have occasion to borrow and lend in dollars. 4 Under normal circumstances, these borrowers can access dollar funding at the same schedule of interest rates as U.S. banks, conditional on their level of credit risk.
Beginning in August 2007, however, signs of problems in the interbank lending market emerged. On August 9, the French bank BNP Paribas announced that, because of illiquid markets, it was unable to determine net asset values for three of its credit-focused hedge funds and would suspend redemptions from those funds. 5 The announcement caused fi nancial institutions to reassess their counterparty credit risk, particularly given concerns over the credit quality of U.S. subprime mortgages and banks' increased demand for liquidity.
The disruptions in the interbank lending market in August 2007 were refl ected in the spread between the London interbank offered rate (Libor), an unsecured lending rate, and the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, a measure of average expected overnight rates. The Libor-OIS spread captures the additional cost of "term" (longer than overnight) borrowing relative to rolling overnight borrowing, and refl ects the risk that a lender may not renew an overnight contract. Thus, the sharp rise in the spread at the onset of the crisis was a sign that interbank lending at longer maturities was regarded as particularly risky. The spread remained elevated until the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, when it spiked to unprecedented levels before moderating somewhat (Chart 1).
A factor that exacerbated the funding pressures faced by banks during this period was the need to provide backstop fi nancing for structured investment vehicles (SIVs). 6 Many SIVs had funded themselves by issuing asset-backed commercial paper, a practice that led to a rapid increase in commercial paper outstanding during 2005 and 2006 (Chart 2) . With the onset of the fi nancial crisis, concerns mounted about the quality of SIV assets, causing investor appetite for asset-backed commercial paper issued by SIVs to plummet. As a result, banks were forced to fi nd alternative fi nancing for the assets.
Although both U.S. and foreign banks held some assets of questionable credit quality, the severely reduced supply of wholesale dollar funding was especially detrimental for foreign banks. U.S. banks tend to have large deposit bases denominated in dollars, enabling them to fund their dollar-denominated assets and making them natural net lenders in the dollar interbank funding markets. Foreign banks, by contrast, generally lack signifi cant deposit bases in dollars
The Introduction of Reciprocal Currency Arrangements On December 12, 2007, the Federal Reserve announced the establishment of foreign exchange swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. In its press release, the Fed indicated that the swap lines, like the Term Auction Facility created at the same time, were intended "to address elevated pressures in short-term funding markets. " 7
How the Swap Lines Worked
The swaps involved two transactions. At initiation, when a foreign central bank drew on its swap line, it sold a specifi ed quantity of its currency to the Fed in exchange for dollars at the prevailing market exchange rate. At the same time, the Fed and the foreign central bank entered into an agreement that obligated the foreign central bank to buy back its currency at a future date at the same exchange rate. Because the exchange rate for the second transaction was set at the time of the fi rst, there was no exchange rate risk associated with the swaps.
The foreign central bank lent the borrowed dollars to institutions in its jurisdiction through a variety of methods, including variablerate and fi xed-rate auctions. In every case, the arrangement was between the foreign central bank and the institution receiving funds. The foreign central bank determined the eligibility of institutions and the acceptability of their collateral. And the foreign central bank remained obligated to return the dollars to the Fed and bore the credit risk for the loans it made.
At the conclusion of the swap, the foreign central bank paid the Fed an amount of interest on the dollars borrowed that was equal to the amount the central bank earned on its dollar lending operations. In contrast, the Fed did not pay interest on the foreign currency it 7 For additional detail on the TAF, see Armantier, Krieger, and McAndrews (2008) .
Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from Bloomberg L.P. acquired in the swap transaction, but committed to holding the currency at the foreign central bank instead of lending it or investing it. This arrangement avoided the reserve-management diffi culties that might arise at foreign central banks if the Fed were to invest its foreign currency holdings in the market.
Expected Effects of the Swaps
The provision of dollar funding to foreign fi nancial institutions through swap lines with central banks was expected to reduce the institutions' funding rollover risk and increase the predictability of funding costs-much the same functions that the TAF performed for U.S. banks. These effects, in turn, could reduce pressures on funding markets in the United States. Moreover, by reducing the need to sell dollar assets at a time of stress, the swaps could lead to improved conditions in U.S. and foreign fi nancial markets more generally.
Although such broader benefi cial effects were possible, the direct purpose of the swaps was limited to addressing overseas pressures in dollar funding markets. The swaps were not structured to provide credit to distressed banks, to mitigate losses banks were facing, or to bolster the capital positions of banks. Rather, the swaps were intended to provide foreign central banks with the capacity to deliver dollar funding to institutions in their jurisdictions during times of market stress.
The Federal Reserve's Role
In principle, foreign central banks could have provided dollar funding to banks in their jurisdictions without the involvement of the Fed. They could have obtained dollars from their own foreign exchange reserves or from the open market. However, the foreign exchange reserves of many central banks at the onset of the crisis were smaller than the amounts they subsequently borrowed under the swap lines, so these reserves alone would not have been sufficient. 
The Evolution of Reciprocal Currency Arrangements
The Federal Reserve's program of foreign exchange swap lines (see table) passed through three broad structural phases. In each phase, the Fed expanded the scope and potential size of the program.
Phase 1: December 12, 2007 , to September 17, 2008 From the program's inception in December 2007 through September 17, 2008, the swap lines acted largely as an overseas extension of the Term Auction Facility. The European Central Bank executed one-month, and later three-month, fi xed-rate tenders at the "stop-out rates, " or lowest rates at which bids were accepted, for the most recent TAF auctions. Despite the resumption of auctions by the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank, excess demand for dollar funding among European banks was once again evident. While the Fed had sharply increased amounts available under the TAF, the amounts available in the auctions of the European Central Bank and Swiss National Bank were limited by the caps on their swap lines, leading to high bid-to-cover ratios in these auctions and signifi cant unmet demand for dollar funding from European banks (Chart 3). 10
Phase 2: September 18, 2008 , to October 12, 2008 As market conditions deteriorated worldwide following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, the Federal Reserve undertook a rapid expansion of its FX swap line program. It extended swap lines to three additional central banks on September 18 and four more on September 24.
Besides opening new swap lines, the Fed aggressively expanded the total quantity of dollars made available to central banks in the program. Over the second phase, the Fed boosted the available amount by nearly a factor of ten, to $620 billion from $67 billion. This expansion allowed a signifi cant increase in the quantity of dollars actually lent by central banks under the swap agreements (Chart 4). By the end of the second phase, on October 12, more than $330 billion in dollar loans was outstanding under the program.
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The bid-to-cover ratio measures the quantity of funds requested relative to the quantity of funds offered.
As foreign central banks expanded the quantity of their dollar loans during the second phase, they also broadened the terms of their lending, auctioning funds at a wider range of maturities. On September 18, the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England supplemented the existing oneand three-month tenders with lending in overnight and one-week tenors (Chart 5). These shorter-term loans were all conducted as variable-rate operations with lending rates set by auction. With these operations, the central banks were able to adjust dollar liquidity to mitigate pressures associated with the end of the quarter, as well as to expand dollar liquidity to address the generally increased pressures in funding markets.
Phase 3: October 13, 2008 , to February 1, 2010 As fi nancial market conditions continued to deteriorate, the Federal Reserve began a third phase of its FX swap line program, expanding it aggressively once again. On October 13-14, 2008, the Fed announced that it would remove the caps from its swap lines with the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of Japan.
In line with this announcement, these four central banks again altered the mechanism through which they provided dollar liquidity to private sector banks. They continued to provide a small amount of overnight funding through fi xed-amount variable-rate auctions for a time, but they also replaced their limited-amount tenders at oneand three-month maturities with fi xed-rate tenders for uncapped amounts at one-week, one-month, and three-month maturities. In that way, eligible institutions could borrow any amount they wished against the appropriate collateral. The rates for these operations, rather than being drawn from the Fed's TAF program, were set by the participating central banks. The Fed also opened swap lines with fi ve more central banks during this phase. 
Measures of Overseas Dollar Funding Pressures
To see how dollar funding pressures in overseas markets evolved over the course of the swap line program, we track the performance of three measures: 1) the overseas-U.S. Libor spread, 2) the dollar basis, and 3) the lending rates from overnight U.S. dollar auctions conducted by foreign central banks. We also draw some inferences about the effectiveness of the swap line program in improving market conditions, but our assessment is necessarily preliminary.
The Overseas-U.S. Libor Spread
Because foreign banks secure much of their dollar funding through interbank loans, they can expect to face greater funding pressures during times of market stress. One way to measure such pressures involves examining the individual borrowing rates of the sixteen banks that make up the Libor survey "panel. " 11 The difference between the average borrowing rate of the panel's thirteen non-U.S. banks and the average borrowing rate of its three U.S. banks provides a rough proxy for the increased diffi culty foreign banks face in trying to borrow dollars (Chart 6). The announcement that caps would be removed on four swap lines in mid-October 2008 had little apparent effect on the spread, but as the new uncapped-quantity auctions were executed and the actual quantity of dollar lending under the swap lines rose in early 11 U.S. dollar Libor is set on a daily basis through a survey that asks the sixteen banks what borrowing rates they face in the interbank market. The published rate is a trimmed average of the banks' individual rates. 12 McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) show statistically that swap line announcements, as well as TAF announcements, narrowed Libor-OIS spreads over the early stages of the programs. Although they do not specifi cally examine the overseas-U.S. Libor spread, it is highly correlated with the Libor-OIS spread, as can be seen by comparing Charts 1 and 6. Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from Bloomberg L.P. and foreign central banks.
Note: A small share of swap line loan terms were somewhat shorter or longer than the most common terms. We group loans of up to four days as overnight, 5-16 days as one week, 17-45 days as one month, and more than 45 days as three months. Source: Authors' calculations, based on data from Bloomberg L.P.
Note: The spread is calculated as the difference between the average borrowing rate of the thirteen non-U.S. banks on the Libor panel and the average borrowing rate of the three U.S. banks on the panel. November 2008, the spread began to ease. By late January 2009, the spread had stabilized in a range of 2 to 6 basis points, where it stayed through January 2010, despite the drop in swaps outstanding.
The Dollar Basis
European banks having diffi culty borrowing dollars in the interbank market also have the ability to acquire dollar funding by borrowing euros in the interbank market, then executing a foreign exchange swap for U.S. dollars with a private counterparty. Economic intuition, formalized in the principle of covered interest parity, suggests that the total cost of this action, combining the cost of borrowing in euros and the cost of executing the FX swap, should be approximately the same as the cost of direct borrowing. We use a daily estimate of the spread between the cost of indirect borrowing in dollars using euro/U.S. dollar FX swaps and the cost of direct borrowing in dollars. This spread, known as the dollar basis, provides a measure of the relative stresses on overseas borrowers of U.S. dollars (Chart 7). 13
The dollar basis followed much the same pattern as the overseas-U.S. Libor spread: essentially zero through early August 2007, elevated through December 2007, close to zero again through March 2008, higher through the summer, up to unprecedented levels following Lehman's bankruptcy, and then down slightly in late 2008. The basis subsequently remained at moderately high levels through January 2010. The movements of the dollar basis provide some support for the notion that the swap line operations helped ease dollar funding strains on foreign banks. Moreover, they are consistent with statistical fi ndings that swap line announcements and operations were effective in reducing the basis.
Interestingly, however, while the overseas-U.S. Libor spread and the dollar basis generally moved together, the basis rose to much higher levels during the crisis. One reason for the difference is that 13 Coffey, Hrung, Nguyen, and Sarkar (2009) describe the dollar basis and its behavior during the fi nancial crisis.
the Libor panel includes only large banks, whereas the level of the basis can be infl uenced by the market activity of smaller and riskier banks. If anything, the basis probably underestimates the dollar funding pressures faced by many European banks, given that riskier institutions were likely unable to borrow euros at Libor rates.
Despite allegations that some Libor panel banks were underreporting borrowing costs in early 2008, 14 we do not believe that any such underreporting signifi cantly biases our fi ndings for either the overseas-U.S. Libor spread or the dollar basis. First, the sharp movements in these two measures began before the alleged period of underreporting. Second, there is independent evidence of severely impaired liquidity in the euro/U.S. dollar FX swap market from September 2007 through January 2008, consistent with the hypothesis of a massive rise in demand for U.S. dollars from European banks. 15
Lending Rates in Foreign Central Banks' Overnight Dollar Operations
The European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, and the Bank of England all conducted overnight variable-rate auctions for U.S. dollars during the swap line program's second and third phases. The rates bid for dollars in these auctions provide some insight into pressures in overseas U.S. dollar funding markets over this period.
Specifi cally, the stop-out rates from these auctions (Chart 8) reveal elevated funding pressures at the end of September 2008, with especially high demand for funds over the quarter-end. Funding pressures again rose on October 7 and 8, particularly in Europe. Funding pressures then appear to have relaxed during the program's third phase, starting in mid-October, suggesting that the aggressive expansion of dollar lending by foreign central banks had benefi cial effects. The European Central Bank stopped overnight auctions in midOctober after a series of low stop-out rates, while the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of England discontinued the overnight auctions in early November after a series of undersubscribed auctions.
Overall, our look at the evolution of funding pressures during the crisis suggests that swap line program announcements and operations were effective at easing strains in dollar funding markets. Moreover, our descriptive fi ndings are supported by a number of more rigorous studies employing statistical analyses. 16 
Conclusion
During the second half of 2007, the functioning of U.S. dollar funding markets became impaired as credit and liquidity concerns increased. The scarcity of interbank lending made it particularly diffi cult for non-U.S. banks to fund the dollar-denominated assets on their balance sheets, even as they were taking on additional dollar assets through backstop fi nancing to structured investment vehicles.
Through direct lending, the Federal Reserve had a channel to reduce funding pressures for U.S. banks. With interbank lending 14 See, for example, Mollenkamp (2008) and Mollenkamp and Whitehouse (2008) .
15 See Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008) . 16 Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010) Early evidence suggests that the swap lines were successful in smoothing disruptions in overseas dollar funding markets. Swap line announcements and operations were associated with improved conditions in these markets: Although measures of dollar funding pressures remained high throughout the crisis period, they tended to moderate following large increases in dollars lent under the swap line program. Moreover, the sharp decline in swap line usage as the crisis ebbed suggests that the pricing of funds offered through swap lines gave institutions an incentive to return to private sources of funding as market conditions improved.
